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The Gray Fleece of the Crimson
Catt: A Primer of Tax Nonsense
By JomH BATr*
I. NONSENSE AND INNOCENSE
Nonsense is an important thing. It is all around us; a stanza
from "Jabberwocky" by Lewis Carroll illustrates:
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gunble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogroves,
And the mome raths outgabe.1
Now this is poetry and a special sample, and its meaning is
apparent-it is nonsense. This we know, and nonsense we can
expect from Lewis Carroll, poets of "The Absurd," "New Wave"
writers, Dali, and certain psychotics. But affairs of government
and money are not nonsense it seems-but seems is not certainly
SO.
This paper is about seeming not being certainly so. I describe
what I label the nonsense of federal taxation, that is, certain of
those notions related to federal taxation that are factually absurd.
Despite their absurd natures these ideas are widely held by the
public, and by a fat cluster of those who are masters of the legal
science. To condemn all those who hold these notions is
pompous error, for they receive these notions as parts of a
pre-structured political credo. Being busy men, they must live
on faith in many matters, and, of course, the words of the Wise
are often overwhelming. I suggest that these bits of buncombe
have the longevity of robust viruses only because the offer to
examine fable alongside of fact is seldom made. I make this
invitation. My ultimate purpose is to show that tis nonsense
helps to preserve tax privileges for a very few but very powerful
special interest groups at the expense of over 90% of our tax-
0 Professor of Law, Universitv of Kentucky.
1 Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 138 (Pocket Book ed. 1951).
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payers. This nonsense also prevents the allocation of American
wealth to projects vital to the protection and progress of our
nation. Companng fact with fable in this instance is a practical
task-it tells who pays.2
II. DISTRIMUTION OF WEALTH AND INCOME
Primary nonsense is nonsense that is more senseless than other
nonsense; it is bold and brassy We deal first with a piece of
primary nonsense.
A current American idea is that in our country there has been
a major redistributon of wealth and income.3 The poor grow
richer and the rich grow poorer. Attached to -this idea is the
belief that progressive federal taxation has worked in collabora-
tion with other events to bring about this change.4 Two major
cults have bombarded the public with the news of the change
in the dished-out shares of our economic pie. Each cult, however,
preaches a different creed.
First, there are pleasant apologists who puff the praises of the
new people's capitalism where egalitarianism reigns. Second,
there are stern patriarchs (David Reisman would call them
inner-directed souls) who rue the nun of the "American Way of
Life," this way of life being characterized for them by the
components of the agrarian myth.5 They argue that yeoman
integrity, frontier individualism, the characteristics of thrift, com-
mon morality, and all things beautiful and true have been
destroyed or are in jeopardy of destruction because of this
unnatural change in our way of life. It is these advocates of the
strength of the strong and the victory of the fit who stress the
part of federal taxation in altering the distribution of wealth
and income. The pleasant apologists while pulpiting the wonders
2 This nonsense perpetuates old tax loopholes and aids in the legislation of
new pnvileges. Randolph Paul, an outstanding writer on taxation, has stated that
loopholes mean little until one s gross income is a great deal over $25,000 a year.
R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 678 (1954). For added information on
tax provisions for special interests see Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue
Code, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 745 (1955).
3 Popular penodicals and business sources make this point with a frequency
akan to that of the exhaling aspect of the human breathing cycle.
4 Technological progress, specialization of functions, effective distribution ar-
rangements, government regulation of monopoly power, the rise of the "corporate
conscience" etc. are a sample of the "other factors."
5 Hofstader, The Age of Reform 23 (Vintage ed. 1960).
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of change speak softly about taxation for they apparently approve
of thngs as they are. As astute reformers, it may be that they
prefer the silent dog-paddle to the more splashingly energetic
but noisier and thus less politically effective crawl stroke.
We examine briefly the styles of talk of the apologists and
patnachs, and then move on to an analysis of words positioned
next to facts.
For the apologists: John Galbraith tells of the "affluent
society" and David Lilienthal finds, "the physical benefits of our
society distributed widely to almost everyone, with scant regard
to status, class, or the origin of the individual"6 David Reisman
and Adolf A. Berle, Jr. have also helped to support the current
illusion. Along with a number of journalists, these men have been
the balladiers of the pleasant society-a society where all class
lines melt and Harlan County, Kentucky, comes to Park Avenue.
On the other side of the bamcade stand our stem patriarchs:
the defenders of the "American Way of Life" They are generally
displeased with the new state of the nation, especially with the
state of federal income taxation, 'and from frequency of outcry,
tell us that the income tax has put us on the "road to serfdom"7
and that the tax has manacled us to "Big Brother."8 And if we
are not on the road, or manacled to Big Brother, we are fighting
in the gutters of cities-because the tax has kindled a Marxian
"class war."9 If we are in none of the painful postures just
mentioned, we have certainly lost our "natural rights," and
"private property" has been sold for a mess of pablum. When
it comes to comment from this quarter, the following is the
calmest statement available:
The graduated tax is a confiscatory tax. Its effect, and to
a large extent, its ann, is to bring down all men to a common
level.10
Now, no one can doubt that a progressive tax is a class tax.
Our progressive tax came out of conflict between populist
6 Lilienthal, Big Business: A New Era 202 (1953).
7 This thesis is propounded m Chodorov, The Income Tax: Root of All Evil
(1954).
8 Ibid.
9 Pettengill, The History of a Prophecy: Class War and the Income Tax, 473
A.B.A.J. 39 (1953).
10 Coldwater, Conscience of a Conservative 64 (Victor ed. 1961).
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elements and industrial control factions.1 The theory of pro-
gressive taxation is that the rich should pay more than the poor.
Theoretically, the concept of ability to pay controls. However,
I am not concerned with the theory; I think we need to know
what has actually happened. Do the terms used by the pleasant
apologists and the stern patriarchs relate to the facts of our
economic life? Our axial question is: to what extent has there
been a redistribution of wealth and income in the United States?
For if there has been none, neither blame nor praise can be placed
on the federal taxing process.
Those people who most loudly publicize the change in the
distribution pattern of wealth suggest one basic indicator as
establishing the truth of their claim. This indicator is the wide
public dispersion of stock-ownership. I consider this element of
proof.
From many megaphones we hear it proclaimed that the
people of America own the productive assets of our society
Stock-ownership by The Mass has supposedly brought on a
peaceful "socialization of the means of production."'2 With sup-
port from even non-partisan cheering sections, is it strange that
American Big Business speaks of the new socialism with pride?
Roger Blough, chairman of the board of U S. Steel, has told us
of the new rule with calm dignity General Electric, with just
a word in about better things for better living, tells us the same.1
3
Standard Oil trots out Karl Marx to make the point. Propaganda
makes strange comrades. In a recent pamphlet, Standard says:
"Karl Marx s prophecy has been realized. " It is so that the
"people owni the tools of production. "14
The fact is that "peoples capitalism" is an illusion. The
data on stock ownership follows. In 1927, 4-6 million individuals
owned stock. Our population was then 119 million; thus means
that 3.4-5% of the population had an ownership share in United
11 For the history of progressive taxation in the United States see A. Paul,
Conservative Crisis and The Rule of Law 185 (1960); R. Paul, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 714.
12 R. Ross & van den Hoag, The Fabnc of Society- An Introduction to the
Social Sciences 393 (1957).
13 A random run through a month s output of either the Wall Street
Journal or The New York Times will add DuPont, AT & T, and many others to
the list of adherents to the General Electric theory.
14 Undated pamphlet, in the authors files, published by the Standard Oil Co.
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States corporations."5 By 1937 we had 8-9 million individual
stockholders and a population of 129 million.' Thus 6-7% of
our population owned stock. But in 1958, only 5.1% of our
population owned stock or only 8,680,000 people out of 168
million.' 7 Gregory Kolko of Harvard University has said that
in 1959 there was a rise in stock ownership and that in that year
7% of all Americans owned stock.'8 I would estimate that since
the early 1962 market slide, we are below the 1959 figure. Even
if we accept Kolko's figure, we see that there is a heavy
concentration of ownership within a small part of our popula-
tion.1 No great change has come about since the late 1920's.
Concentration of ownership is even heavier than the above
figures show Robert Lampman, chairman of the Economics
Department of the University of Wisconsin, is the author of a
recent myth-mashing study 20 This 1962 work, brought out tnder
the seal of the impartial National Bureau of Economic Research,
shows that within the small minority owning stock, a still smaller
group owns the bulk of these shares. Lampman finds that 1%
of the adult population in the United States owns 767 of all
corporate stock. -i In 1922, this 1% owned only 61.5% 2o Owner-
ship is more concentrated now than it was in the days of the
Old Order. But even this 1% must be considered as having an
even more elite nucleus within its membership. Dividend plums
go, in the main, to a limited elite of 1/10 of 1%. I know of no
recent calculation of the percentage of dividends received by
this elite; however, a 1949 figure is interesting.2 One hundred
sixty-five thousand people received 42% of all corporate dividends
15 Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 374
(1932).
16 Senate Temporary National Economic Committee, The Distribution of
Ownership in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations, Monograph No. 29,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 168 (1940) [hereinafter referred to as T.N.E.C. Mono-
graph No. 29].
17 President's Economic Report 112 (Jan. 1957).
is Kolko, Wealth and Power in America 51 (1962).
10 Every major study of stock ownership done smnce the 1930's has demon-
strated the existence of this heavy concentration of ownership to be fact. E.g.,
Kimmel, Share Ownership in the United States (1952); T.N.E.C. Monograph
No. 29; Survey Research Center, Stock Ownership Among American Families
(Dec. 1960).2o Lampman, The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth (1962).
21 Id. at 209.
22 Ibid.
23 See Mills, The Power Elite 121 (Oxford ed. 1959). Mill's figures are
based on the United States Statistics of Income.for 1949.
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in that year, and the minimum, income of these people was
$80,000. Only 13% of all 1949 corporate dividends went to
people with incomes of less than $5,000.
Deeper analysis indicated with emphasis the disparity be-
tween the fact of stock-ownership and the claim. It may be
more graphic to view the matter in another way The following
table shows ownership by occupation. This table is taken from
J. A. Livingston s "The American Stockholder", Livingston's table
is based on a Brookings Institute Study 2
4
% of Occupation Group
Occupation Group Owning Stock
Executives .................................................... 44 8%
Supervisors .................................................. 19.4
Professional Persons .................................... 12.8
Salesm en (a) ................................................ 11.2
M erchants .................................................... 10 6
Clerical Workers ........................................ 7.6
Farm ers ........................................................ 6.8
Skilled Workers-Foremen ........................ 4.4
Public Service Workers .............................. 3.4
Semi-skilled Workers .................................. 1 4
Unskilled ...................................................... 0.2
Members of Armed Forces (b) ................ 1.1
Retired, Dependents .................................. 0.1
Housewives-Nonemployed ...................... 6.0
Nonemployed Adults .................................. 1 3
Student and Pre-school Age ...................... 0.2
(a) For manufacturers and wholesalers
(b) iavmg m households
Stock-ownership is the norm only in the executive class, and
it is a rarity among low status groups. The 1955 Consumer
Finance Survey by the U S. Government affirms this assertion
and substantially supports the conclusions of the Brookmgs
Institute study 25 This U S. Government study was keyed to
spending units, a spending unit being a family or an unmarried
mdividual-the one man family Allocating spending units to
lob groups, the study found that only 3% of all the units in
the unskilled worker group owned any stock. Five hundred
to one thousand dollars was the median amount owned by
24 J. Iavingston, The Amiencan Stockholder 32 (1958).
25 Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Supp. XLT, at 622
Table 19 (June 1955).
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the 3%, and on the basis of current dividend payments, they
would average about $50 a year in dividend receipts, or about
3 days pay The above sums and percentages also applied
to skilled and semi-skilled groups. Only 9% of the units in the
clerical and sales groups held stock and the median holding was
$1000. This study also concluded that wage earners owned only
0.3% of all stock and in dollar value their holdings were worth
$750,000,000. In 1956, the Mellon and Rockefeller families each
owned stock valued at over $3,000,000,000.2 The Duponts alone
owned stock worth more than $4,000,000,00027 Taking the Du-
ponts alone, we see that the value of their stock is 5 times the
value of the stock owned by all wage earners.
By the measure of stock-ownership, it is clear that-there has
been no real redistribution of wealth. Other measures push us
to the same conclusion. The Lampman study shows that 1%
of the adult population holds 26% of all personal wealth.28 This
1% owns almost all of the state and local government bonds
and between 10% and 30% of all other varieties of personal
wealth29 In 1949, this 1% held 20.8% of the personal wealth,
and, by 1956, their share had increased by 5.2% to 26%.30 In
1933, this group held 28.3% of the personal wealth.31 There has
not been much change despite the often bemoaned Roosevelt
"revolution."
In addition, there is empirical proof that:
A radically unequal distribution of income has been char-
acterstic of the American social structure since at least 1910,
and despite minor year-to-year fluctuations no significant
trend toward income equalization has appeared.32
This is the conclusion reached by Professor Gregory Kolko of
Harvard University in is recently released study Kolko treated
"the nation's population as an aggregate of families and unat-
26See Perlo, The Empire of High Finance 45, Table I (1957), on the
holdings of these families. For further confirmation see LVI Fortune Magazine 77
(Nov. 1957). To see that tlungs are about the same as they were in 1937 see
T.N.E.C. Monograph 29, at 116 Table 6.
27 Ibid.28 Lampman, op. cit. supra note 20, at 192.
29 Id. at 23-24.
80 Id. at 24.
a' Ind.32 Kolko, op. cit. supra note 18, at 13. Kolko's data is based on material con-
tamed in the files of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve
System and on material furnished by the National Industrial Conference Board.
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tached individuals ranked according to the size of their income."
This aggregate was divided into ten groups with each group
made up of the same number of families and unattached
individuals. Each group is called an income tenth. Kolko applied
this procedure to all years from 1910-1959. He finds the income
share of the top richest tenth to be in 1959 only a little less than
it was in 1910. The only important gains in income were made
by the second and third richest income tenth; all other tenths
kept about the same share with one exception. The two poorest
tenths actually had a smaller share of income in 1959 than they
did in 1910.
33
Leon Keyserling, former chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisors, in a recent pamphlet, Poverty and Depnva-
tion in the United States,34 fills out the picture of the affluent
society a little more. Keyserling finds that 77,000,000 Americans
are living in states of poverty or economic deprivation. As a
norm of income, Keyserling posits $4,000; this sum is the
minimum needed to decently support a multiple person family
Keyserling s standard of $4,000 is much more realistic than the
minimum figure of $1,000 that John Galbraith speaks of in the
"Affluent Society'" when he tells us that poverty is an "after-
thought" in America. The National Bureau of Labor Statistics
supports Keyserlings minimum as being correct and also his
position on the extent of poverty and deprivation in America."
Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1959 showed that in 20 large
cities, the average income required to meet the basic standard
of livng was $6,084 (before taxes) for a family of 4.3' 55.6%
of all incomes in the United States fall below this figure. This
proves nothing directly as to the state of poverty, but does show
that most Americans are not living the regal life bleated about
by academics who know nothing of America's New Wilderness.
Although real incomes have increased and the standard of living
is better for many people, there are great distances between
income classes and in America there are a great number of truly
poor people.
33Tis information in tis paragraph comes from Kolko, op. cit. supra note
18, at 14.
34 Published by Conference on Economic Progress. Wasington, D.C. (1962).
35 See Kolko, op cit. supra note 18, at 158 n.15.
36 Kolko, op. cit. supra note 18, at 158 n.15.
37 Ibid.
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The charge that federal taxation has been an important factor
m altering the distribution of wealth m America is absolutely
false. This is a simple affair of logic. Since there has been no
real change in the pattern of distribution of wealth, or that of
income, federal taxation could not have been of any importance.
In sum: the progressive tax class war has been a very tepid
revolution, its only heat derived from the motion of violently
agitated symbols and signs. Where there is much heat, there is
often no light.
We step now to our second dragon. It is sibling to the dis-
tribution of wealth matter.
III. Tnn FoLK My=H OF PROGRESSION
A major myth propounded by the critics of the "leveled
society" is that we have a heavily progressive income tax. We
do not. Our "confiscatory tax" is unreasonable only in print. The
expanding rate which appears to mushroom like some gangrenous
gas from 20% to 91% is misleading. Randolph Paul once said
that, "The bark of our individual income tax is worse .than its
bite.".38 Trite is true. Congressional concern with the welfare
of specific interests has crumbled the progressive rate and the
bracket bricks have plunked heavily on the heads of the middle
and lower income groups.
Professor Richard Musgrave, a Johns Hopkins University
economist working with "Statistics of Individual Income" for
1956, provides us with several interesting msights.39 Income-
splitting by married persons, long-term capital gains treatment,
percentage depletion, and other varieties of Congress-legislated
avoidance have abraded the progressive rate until a mighty
mount is now a knoll. Musgrave shows that individuals with
incomes over $1,000,000 pay an actual tax on gross income of
only 24%. 40 Individuals with incomes between $50,000 and
$100,000 pay an actual tax on a gross income of 28 %. On
incomes between $20,000 and $25,000 the actual tax paid is
8 Eroson of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 Tax L. Rev. 208, 204
(1956).
'39 See Musgrave, How Progressive Is the Income Tax, House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium: Compendium of
Papers on Broadening the Tax Base, vol. 3, at 2223 (Comm. Print 1959)
[Hereinafter referred to as Tax Revision Compendium].
40 Id. at 12226, Table 2, plan 8, col. 1.
41 Ibid.
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23%, only 1% less than those earning over a million pay
Compare these actual tax-paid percentages with the average
scheduled rates.
Musgrave's work refutes the current sophism of those who
see the progressive rate as the carcinoma of the age. He verifies
what the Harvard Business Study found to be fact in 1953.
By far the most striking and significant (feature of our
tax system) is the large excess of theoretical over actual
rates. 48
A tax that began as a class.tax has been refined into a mass
levy Two years before Pearl Harbor only about 4,000,000 people
paid income taxes.44 Today 46,000,000 individuals' ransoms the
general coffers fill. 45 1960 was a year in which these 46,000,000
taxpayers paid up $41,000,000,000.46 The flat rate of 20% brought
in 86% of this amount; only .14% came from the pathetically
unprogressive "progressive" rates.17 The "assault on capital" is a
myth. But, like the songs our mothers taught us, this melody of
progression is very hard to -forget'
Having marked down with emphasis the vaporous quality of
the argument that we have a progressive income tax, we move on
to specific areas relevant to our information on progressivity
My aim in lightly autopsying the several subjects discussed m
the pages that follow is twofold. First, to show what special tax
treatments have led to the undoing of progression; second, to
examine other items of verbal nonsense as they relate to the
specific topics.
A. Two Hearts, One Love-lotnt Return
Polygamists benefit from income splitting no more than
monogamists. Morally, this may be as things should be. How-
ever, to argue that three wives cost more than one and should
entitle one to unusual tax relief fits readily into the rationale of
those who defend the cutting of income into two taxable parts.
But then, rationale in this territory has never sounded as con-
vincing as Mark Antony in oration. Yet, if a battery of pollsters
42 Ibid.
4 3 Butters, Thompson & Bollinger, Investments by Individuals 85 (1953).
44 Eisenstem, The Ideologies of Taxation 56 (1961).
46 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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were to interview the man-behind-the Daily Mirror and most
behind-the New York Times, they would learn that income-
splitting, along with the $600 exemptions, make up the only moral
aspects of our tax law Everyman smiles on income splitting, but,
to twist the words in Antony's mouth, "Good friends, sweet
friends, let me stir you up. "48
Senate debate on the 1948 tax bill which brought us this angel
for Everyman is a good point of anabasis. Senator Kerr celebrated
the split-income provision's benevolence by arguing that it was
legally available to all mramed men and women.49 This he said
was enough. Senator Humphrey thought this, "something like
the equality of which Anatole France spoke, when he said that
the rich and the poor alike can sleep under a bridge."50 What
exactly did Senator Humphrey mean? Hadn't this congressional
angel put the residents of the common law states on a par with
the people of community property states? There is usually a
"yes" at this point, all make proper bows and a roar of thanks
voted. But as usual-in this absurd world-seems is not certainly
SO.
A brief review of pertinent legal history will make it clear
that although the easy answer is accurate, it also serves as
felicitous mast for other inequalities. The community property
system had its roots in Continental concepts of law and naturally
worked its way into the law of states such as California, Texas,
Louisiana, and those others with a Continental heritage. Eventu-
ally, this natural development came to work some unnatural
results in terms of taxation. Prior to the 1948 income-splitting
provision, common law state husbands and community property
husbands earning equal incomes had very different tax bills.
Assume in 1947 both earned $30,000 in income. The husband in
the common law state paid $11,970 in federal income tax, while
the community property state husband paid only $8,541. The
difference was the result of the buffering of progression by
the community property concept. The mramed man in the com-
mon law state paid at the progressive rate on an income of
$80,000. In the community property state, the $30,000 income
was split into two $15,000 units-one unit was considered the
48 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 60 (Pocket Book ed. 1958).
49 R. Paul, op. cit. supra note 2, at 612.
5o Ibid.
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husband's; the other, the wife's. This was so, as each spouse under
community property theory is held to be the one-half owner of
income received. The sum of the taxes on these two $15,000
units was less than the tax on the single sum of $30,000. The
United States Supreme Court recognized the community property
wife s separate ownership, although, m fact, a community prop-
erty husband had approximately the same degree of suzerainty
over the property as a common law husband."
Inequality created a mazy problem for inequality was begin-
ning and end. Non-community property states began to pass laws
so that their residents would receive the preferred tax treatment,
and, not to be outdone, artful practitioners devised ways by
which income could be split between husband and wife. All
gambits added up to a loss in revenue and to major administrative
and enforcement migraines for the Treasury Congressional
action in the form of the income-splitting provision prevented
the migraines, but cost the United States several billion dollars
in revenue. As for the equity in the provision-it was highly
selective; the Treasury estimated that only 22% of all taxpayers
benefited from the income-split.5 - Of all benefits from the split,
97 /% went to people with 1947 incomes of over $5000.53 It was
admitted in the Senate debate of 1947 that real benefits began at
an income of $10,000. 54 In 1957 the situation was about the
same: 70% of joint returns filed received no benefit from income
splitting.55
In 1942, the Treasury, following President Roosevelt's lead,
had tried to dam up this revenue loss. The Treasury had
planned a system of mandatory joint returns. Income of husbands
and wives living together would have been required to be
reported on one return and the tax computed on a single income.
This proposal had support in the House Ways and Means
Committee, or, at least, there was a great deal of opposition to
community property privilege. But strange are the ways of
House. Committees. Randolph Paul has said that a proposal
contrary to the interest of the community property states was
51 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
52 Blough, The Federal Taxing Process 320 (1952).
53 Ibid.
54 R. Paul, op. cit. supra note 2, at 612.
55 Kolko, op. cit supra note 18, at 36.
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about to be adopted, but "the community property states arranged
a deal to vote in favor of a 45% corporate rate if those favoring
the rate would vote against the community property proposal.
The Community property privilege remained undisturbed.""0
Politics prevailed. This was a perfect way out. Community
property married people were happy; they had what they had
had. The married in common law states were also pleased for
now they had equal justice under the law Yet, as always, justice
was not perfect. But what can one expect of a blind woman in a
night-gown? And so income-splitting was born and Orpheus
descends.
Income-splittmg, courtesan that she is, is maintained by public
ignorance and by specious theory building. Critics of proposals
for reform analagous to the 1942 Treasury position argue in this
way-
it seems appropriate to say quite bluntly that it is
hard to imagine a more inequitable, immoral and antisocial
tax proposal. Its adoption would have imposed an annual
progressive tax on the maintenance of the legal state of
marriage.57
The quoted authority relates that in England joint returns
are required, and the income as a single unit is taxed according
to the progressive rate. Our authority says that one often hears
that so-and-so can not be married because of the tax, and this is
bad as these people are always "pleasant and respectable." Then
leaping all logical middles, our authority concludes that if the
reform were brought off in the United States, some states would
grant a divorce on the ground that sound family fiscal manage-
ment was impaired by the tax law This argument I place with
those others that belong in the catacombs of jocular jurisprudence.
At the time when the mandatory joint return was being debated
in Congress, those ambling along similar paths of thought argued
that a joint return would destroy a woman's new-won individual
rights or would wreck the marriage relationship. This appeal to
unreason, however, gains adherents. But this variety of analysis
does not bring within our ken the facts that are relevant to the
question of an equitable provision. The Brandeis method of
arithmetic is much more useful.
56 R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 302 (1954).
57 Smith, Tax Reform 44 (1961).
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When one cedes the hope of the 1942 Treasury suggestion
becoming law and with it bringing maximum revenues, he turns
to other matters in hope of giving an equitable basis in income
splitting. Splitting is premised on the assumed fact that equal
incomes are not of the same value in different hands. Extra
responsibilities may shrink the true value of one's income. Thus,
single taxpayers are not treated in the same manner as married
taxpayers. This is so even though a brother supports a younger
brother and spends as much on the boy as he would on a wife.
But there are even stranger things in this house of mad mirrors.
For instance, single persons and married persons with incomes
under $2,000 pay the same tax.58 If you earn under $2,000, your
wife does not cost you anything. This is astounding information!
Would our previously cited authority suggest that this inequality
contributes to the immorality of the poor? Do they philander
rather than marry, as a wife won't help their tax position? Even
allowing for some extra costs for the spouse, the single taxpayer
can make a rocky argument against the equity of the present
arrangement. On an income of $15,000, a single person pays
$4,780, while a married couple pays $3,620.n1 At $24,000, the
single taxpayer pays $9,560; the mramed couple pays $6,800.60
At $30,000, the single taxpayers pays $13,220; the married couple,
$9,460.61 At $100,000, the single taxpayer pays $67,320; the
married couple, $53,640. 620 I can suggest that the incongruity
revealed above has no empirical justification. Income-splitting,
when melded with progression, yields surrealism. We move on to
Dada.
Mystics who continue to support income-splitting ignore the
existence of the single taxpayer and press like Gunga Din to the
shrine. Their shrine is equality among married taxpayers. Recall
Senator Kerr's statement that income-splitting is available to all
married taxpayers? This is so but it is not to the point. We need
to know how available it is to different taxpayers. For how
compare the poor man's pennies to the rich man's green bills?
Having a wife when one's income is under $2,000 means
58 Pichman, Income Splitting, Tax Revision Compendium, vol 1, at 477.
59 lind.6o Ibzd.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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nothing in terms of one's tax position-you save nothing. You
are treated as a single person, your incomes are equal, and the
law says you have no more responsibilities. At $5,000, a married
couple saves $80.1 At $10,000, the couple saves $440." At
$20,000, $1,980 is saved by the couple. At $30,000, the couple
keeps $3,760.65 And at $200,000, the couple keeps $22,180.66 So,
at $2,000, the darling wife is tax-wise worth $0, but at $200,000,
she is worth $22,180.
Giddy as the sometime fortunes of the stock market are these
climbs in wife value. Shaw might have quipped of constancy
and punned it to constancy of value and surely humor would be a
proper Freudian response to these embarrassing facts. How Con-
gress divined the values is beyond all but the seers. How much
a wife costs may have been answered in Reno, but I think the
Congress has hardly slept on the matter. But I can say that the
bulk of the benefits of this provision do go to those married
couples with high incomes. This benefit costs over $4,000,000,000
a year in tax revenue.67 Again, we see that the supporting
theories for this de facto preference are but a bastionig of the
status quo.
B. The Virtues and the Graces and the Capital Gams
Income splitting is surrounded by no trou-de-loup of ideology;
it lives rather by its aura of equity-a cross on the breast of the
White Knight. But when we enter the world of incentive, we see
apology is again with us. In this symphony of pure noise, we are
searching for the chords of clarity The aim is to test the
legitimacy of the claims of those who receive preferential treat-
ment. We begin with a look at capital gains, move to the domain
of the oil depletion allowance and finish up in the executive suite.
This is something of a select tour of the many circles of the
subdivision of preference.
The concept of capital gains is in many metaphysical ways
linked to the "American Way of Life." The almost mystic
emanation from the Excalibur of capital gains is part of our
63lbid.
64Id.
05 lbzd.
66 Ibzd.
67 TWhd.
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defense against the dragons:- "Foreign Agression," "Domestic De-
pression," and the destruction of "Small Business." Special con-
sideration of capital gains is "incentive" for the great American
"risk taker" who must be induced to invest in bold frontier enter-
prises, especially those of small business. He must be rewarded for
saving the rest of us from economic ruin. A low capital gains tax
insures that our risk-taker is not "locked into" any dried-out
apricot such as IBM, GM or U S. Steel. He must be free to
move his money, to bet on some new enterprise, or to support
young enterprisers of vision. If the tax is so high that the
risk-taker will lose more because of taxes if he liquidates his
"seasoned securities" than he can make in a new venture, he
will stand pat. If we place a normal tax on these venturers, we
will be "killing the golden-egg geese." This is the theosophy
There are valid reasons why certain types of income from
investments deserve special treatment. A gain might actually
accrue over a long period of tune; it would be unfair to tax the
gain in one year at a progressive rate. This I do not debate. But,
our current law with its scant holding period of six months-
which theoretically separates speculators from investors-patently
exists for other reasons. It is not concerned with true long-term
gains. A new capital gains code could be developed and be made
to follow a line of economic reason, but I do not attempt to
construct one here. I am concerned with abuse and rationale.
First, identification-it is pertinent to know who profits from
the capital gains concession. Earlier, we examined the degree of
concentration of stock ownership in this country We saw that
76% of all corporate stock is owned by 1% of the adult popula-
tion. This fact, plus other information, indicates the persons who
receive the major benefits from capital gains treatment. Four-
fifths of all capital gains are realized from the sale of securitiess
and this means that this 1% holding 76% of the stock receives a
nice share of the income taxed at a maximum of 25%.
The receivers of capital gains income are readily culled from
the ruck. In 1956, 218 taxpayers filed returns showing incomes
of $1,000,000 or more.69 Of these 218, 81% reported capital gains
68 H. Grover, Taxation of Capital Gains, Tax Revision Compendium, vol. 2,
at 1193, 1194.
69 Heke, Taxes from the Workers Viewpoint, Tax Revision Compendium,
vol. 1, at 119, 137
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income. The exclusion of this income from full taxation meant
an average tax saving of $1,453,442 for each of these taxpayers.°
Taxpayers with incomes ranging from $50,000-$600,000 also profit
heavily from the preference.-' More than 60% of the returns in
this income range showed capital gains income. 2 The average
saving per taxpayer was $8,000.73 As the incomes fall into the
lower brackets of affluency, the savings fall off and fewer of the
returns report capital gains. Of all returns with incomes of
$10,000-$15,000, only 17% reported capital gains and the average
tax savings was only $191.- 4 At $5,000-$7,000, 4.2% of the returns
show capital gains and a saving of $128;"t and of the returns with
incomes of under $3,000, only 2.47 show capital gains the aver-
age saving being $81.7( Providing a concrete case: We see that a
worker with a $3,000 income may save a little over a week's pay,
while a man with a $1,000,000 incomes saves as much as 500 men
earning $3,000 a year actually earn in a year.
Two to three billion dollars in revenue is lost by the royal road
of capital gains. Yet, that might be a reasonable price to put down
if the benefits of sharp investment in fact "trickled" down to the
rest of our population. The apologetes of the ideology of
beneficial trickle-down pledge that this two or three billion is well
spent and is in fact our Maginot Line standing against the ogres
of the economic cycle. Persuasion can be a petty art. And I
think it is in this instance-for what the apologetes ask for is wine
as well as bread. Their plea is to insecurity; it is made from
interest, not altruism, and it is, in sum, a strategy that is a
wobbling animated canard. In fact, most capital gains are not
taxed at all and in fact there is no evidence to support the risk-
taking thesis. The capital gains class does not give to anyone
by way of trickle-down. This elite is not locked m-the others
are frozen out.
Capital gains can be passed on from generation to generation
and avoid income taxes. All one need do is sit tight and ride a
market boom. Fortunes made of solid (I use this term relatively)
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 bid.
731 bid.
74 ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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stocks in one of the corporations that make up the various
oligopolies, or stock in a successful close corporation can increase
in value, pass at death, and never see the federal income tax.
Between 1949 and 1955, Wall Street's fat years, stocks on the
New York Stock Exchange appreciated over $100,000,000,000 in
value.7 The securities listed on The Exchange were 1/g of all
securities owned in the United States.7 The 1956 Statistics of
Income show that in the 1949-1955 period, individuals reported
only $30,000,000,000 in net capital gains. Corporations reported
$9,000,000,000 in net capital gain in this period.80 All capital gains
reported from all sources were only 40% of the actual gain of
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. Considering other
securities, and gain connected with other property, it could be
reasonably estimated that only 1/5 of all capital gains sees the
schedules of a tax return.8' The above facts are fine incentive
for any potential risk-taker to stay locked in; no tax is even
better than a little tax. Investors are not stuck with an invest-
ment-they choose to stay with it.
Assuming some investors do want to shift allegiance, a capital
gains tax does not block a move. The Harvard Business Study of
1953 stated that:
In particular, our data conspicuously fail to provide
empirical support for the charge that the capital gains tax
impairs the transfer of capital from seasoned securities to
new ventures of any significant scale.
82
Hundreds of active investors were interviewed in the Harvard
Study Only one said that "the capital gains taxes keep me from
selling some of my holdings and reinvesting in new growing
enterprises."8 3
This study is significant evidence and supports my general
contention, but it is comparatively conservative. In "Power With-
out Property," 4 Adolph A. Berle, Jr., says that, "the habits of the
(individual) investor are chiefly fixed in a direction quite opposite
77 Grover, op. cit. supra note 68, at 1194.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
8- Butters, Thompson & Bollinger, op. cit. supra note 43, at 346.
S3 Ibid.
84 Berle, Power Without Property (1959).
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to venture capital."8 5 Our top 1% which owns that 76% of our
stock is a conservative group; this group's financial advisors are
conservative. The loyalty of all of these pe3ple is to our
established economic institutions. This by itself is significant,
but when one sees what is happening in the security market, the
apologetes sound even more fatuous. Common stock issues have
fallen off greatly In 1960 and 1961, less than $5,000,000,000
worth of new stocks were sold. 6 Most of what was sold was
marketed by public utilities and communications compames. 7 '
Major industrial corporations are doing very little business m the
securities market. And, as any freshman economic student knows,
small business is virtually barred from the major exchanges and,
to put it bluntly, is on its way to becoming non-existent.
In the decade 1947-1959, 60% of all capital used for the
expansion of our industrial facility came from internal sources
-from company reserves and retained earnings.8 " 20% came
from bank credit and another 20% from "outside -sources."" The
United States Department of Commerce indicates that the ratios
are presently about the same." Clearly, individual risk-takers
do not generate the money dynamic that our corporations use to
expand, and we all know that bank credit comes from banks.
How much risk-taking by individuals goes on? Who are "outside
sources"? Are they individuals? If they are, this 20% might be
significant. But, alas, they are not individuals. Insurance com-
pames, pension trusts, and mutual funds are the "outside sources."
Our little man is hardly there and he is surely not very significant.
Individual investors may invest in "outside sources," but these
"outside sources" are not going into risk ventures that help
"small business." Their money is not going into portfolios that
throw money into bold young enterprises. These "outside inter-
ests" are notoriously cautious.
We dramatize the role of the rugged individual man in our
society; we build myths about him. Every Jack London against
the wind of the Wild. It is fine story telling, but a fantasy that
85 Id. at 34.
88 Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 Colum. L. Rev.
433, 440 (1962).
87Ibld.
88 Berle, Power Without Property 42 (1959).
89 Ibid.
90 Berle, supra note 86, at 443, 440.
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can result in great inequity and in ultimate injury to our society
Individual investors do not take chances. They prefer to stay
locked in-and, in truth, who needs them? Our risk-taker is not
there. He should not be rewarded for his non-existence.
C. Oil, Oil Everywhere
The red ribbon of risk flames among all ideologies built upon
the dogma of incentive. The dogma of depletion9 is no exception,
but there are special characteristics of this matter that are
especially interesting. Let us probe.
Of all industries, none is so politically entrenched as oil.
Oil has friends m both major parties; thus, it is always a Con-
gressional favorite. Our oil depletion allowance is testimony to
this truth. Oil has out-ployed steel, aluminum, and other major
industries and has the benefits of an unusual tax advantage. Oil
depletion is an interesting study as this grace costs us billions in
tax revenue and has a well-developed mythology Further, oil
depletion deserves special analysis as it is the herb from which
issues other evils. Other mineral industries have pointed to oil
and in the name of equity claimed a depletion allowance. And
they have-not even had to build up a rationale. So go the wonders
of the tax world.
The mythology of oil depletion consists of two basic tenets:
First, the oil business is a very risky enterprise for the inde-
pendents who are supposedly at the heart of the industry; and
second, it is a main line of our national security For these
reasons, there should be a special "incentive" for people in this
business. To what extent are these tenets truths, half-truths, or
just slogans? This mythology (whatever it is worth) is the
justification for a statutory depletion allowance of 271 % of
gross income. 2 A fictitious illustration will show exactly what this
allowance means to an oilproducer. 3 Apogee Oil Company spends
$1,000,000 for exploration expenses in 1962. Assume that of all
holes drilled, only 2 prove productive. The cost of an unproduc-
tive exploration and drilling is $600,000 and the cost of two
91 For the history of the depletion allowance see R. Paul, Taxation for
Prosperity 804-07 (1947).
92 The allowance, however, can never be more than 50% of taxable income.
93 My illustration is based on an example developed by Professor John A.
Menge, The Role of Taxation in Providing for Depletion of Mineral Reserves, Tax
Revision Compendium, vol. 1, at 967.
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productive wells is $400,000. The $600,000 spent for unproduc-
tive exploration can be written off as a business expense for 1962.
This is a current expense. The $400,000 spent to provide the two
productive wells would probably be written off over a ten year
period at $40,000 a year and the cost would be recouped at the
end of the ten years. Relate these facts to a year's financial
picture for Apogee. Assume that Apogee in 1962 earns $1,000,000
in income. From this Apogee can subtract the $600,000 spent on
the drilling of the unproductive holes and $40,000 in depreciation
related to the two productive wells. This depreciation amount
can be taken every year for the next ten years. Also assume that
Apogee has expenses of $200,000 related to sales and office costs.
Thus, deductions total $840,000 for the year; they are subtracted
from a gross income of $1,000,000, and we see that the taxable
income is $160,000. At this point, the depletion allowance comes
into operation. It is stated as 271% of gross income but is
limited to 50% of taxable income. 27V % of gross income would
be $275,000. However, taxable income is only $160,000 and 50%
is $80,000. Assume the average productive rate of the two wells
is twenty years-the income from the wells would be 20 x
$160,000. $8,200,000 would be the total income over this period
time, but only $1,600,000 would be taxable. Every year, S80,000
would go tax free and over 20 years that would mean $1.600,000
would not be taxed. This is a ghost cost benefit; it has nothing
to do with true costs. The current cost of $600,000 was deducted
in 1962, and the $400,000 that is related to the expense in
bringing in the productive wells is depreciated over a 10 year
period. The depletion allowance plus actual depreciation permits
Apogee to, in effect, write off a $400,000 cost at the amount of
$2,000,000. This is a sum five times the actual cost of bringing
into being the two productive wells. This hypothetical example
is akin to what is done by actual oil companies. Every business
would be happy to write off all costs several times, but only oil
and a few mineral industries are given this advantage.
Oil apologists suggest that "only one exploratory well in nine
finds a new field."9 4 This quest for oil is a perilous business
and "to deny this liberal depletion to the wildcatter and the
94 Tlus is a statement made by a Humble Oil Co. spokesman m Tax Revision
Compendium, vol. 1, at 988.
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pioneer simply destroys the historic figure in our economic
development and enthrones the Rockefellers and the Mellons."9 5
This appeal to pity has little pith in it; rather it is propaganda of
a rank kind. It has little to do with the facts; it is another appeal
to the salvation of the shade of the little man who is hardly
there. All evidence points to the conclusion that the large oil
companies take the bulk of the depletion allowances. Corpora-
tions "account for 90% of the depletion allowance "6 and in
1954, the last year for which this data is available, 70% of the
depletion allowances went to corporations with assets in excess
of $1,000,000."7 The righteous are not always the worthy Strange
things are surely done neath the oily sun by the men who moil
for oil; and all in the name of One Rig Sam, the lonely drillin
man.
The question of risk must still be considered. 1958 figures
in the Oil and Gas Journal, an industry organ, show the risk
incident to exploration for oilY8 The 40 largest oil companies
submitted data on successful as opposed to unsuccessful drilling.
The worst record for any company was 96 dry wells and 105
productive wells. This certainly is not the one of nine or ten
the industry talks about. Looking at the records of the five
largest oil companies, we see a story of certain success. None of
the five companies dropped below a ratio of two successful wells
to one unsuccessful well. The number one company had 287
productive wells to only 100 dry; the number two company came
in with 1,301 productive wells and had only 239 dry wells.
Benefactors of the oil depletion allowance, that is, the large oil
companies, are taking no more risks than other American business-
men. Yet, they remain preferred participants in our process of
production.
Our second element in the dogma of depletion relates to
national defense. Oil is the mainline of our defense, say the
oilmen. This is a gross overstatement. It is no more important
than steel, aluminum, other metals, electronic equipment, etc.,
and, of course, not nearly as important as nuclear material.
Emphasis on oil has led to a great misallocation of capital. Much
95 Quoted in Eisenstem, op. cit. supra note 44, at 131.
96 Iid'
I7 ibid.
98 Menge, op. cit. supra note 93, at 975.
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of the money put into oil and the great profits ploughed back
into it could be better put to use in other ways. Our space
program, highway development, defense projects, and other
priority items could more effectively use this money than the
oil people use it. Oil reserves are at a national high point. We
have tariffed foreign oil out of our market to maintain a price
that is satisfactory to the industry And yet more money is being
pumped into oil and the industry is expanding internally with its
profits.
Senator William Proximire in 1959 presented a comprehensive
tax picture of the oil industry '9 Senator Proxmire's statement is
heavily documented by reference to Treasury statistics. In 1954,
the effective tax rate for corporations was 48%, but the largest
24 oil companies paid only an effective rate of 24%.100 Humble
Oil, a petrol giant, paid only an effective rate of 16.3%,1o1 Its
net income before taxes was $174.8 million, but it paid only
$28.5 million in taxes.1 2 Tidewater Oil with a $38,000,000
income paid only $3.5 million in taxes or an effective rate of less
than 10%. 103 A few wealthy single operators have made huge
profits out of the depletion dispensation; for example, one
operator from 1943 to 1947 had a net income of 14.3 million
dollars. His tax bill for these years was only $80,000.104
There is no incentive for oil money to move into new ventures
of significance. Too much can be had by staying put. It is very
questionable whether or not we should subsidize an industry
that is on the wane. It is even more questionable to do this when
tax revenue which justly could be collected, could be spent for
projects related to our future, not our past. Oil is no longer the
lamp. of the world. It is just another light.
D. The Executive Suite
It is more blessed to receive than to give. This is an accepted
premise in our materialistic culture, where a man's strength is
often measured in horsepower and his intelligence by his ability
to speak with reassuring resonance in soft syllables to child
99 105 Cong. Rec. 8775 (1959).
100 See charts and information, 105 Cong. Ree. 8786 (1959).
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibd.
104 Id. at 8776.
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minds. Measures of worth are in line with guiding principle of
the culture. Ours is a culture of facades, manipulations and
ploys. Role playing, ascending, and power accumulation are for
us prominent values.
Fundamental forms of doing business influence the human
being's social existence as much as they provide for economic
existence, and the modem corporation has done much to alter
the attitudes and styles of life of most Americans. Lines of power
in our society are in the main plugged into the giant corporations.
They are the dynamos of the new day for-directh, and indirectly
-they mold and remold our complex culture. From clothing to
coffee break, the corporations and their people set the style of
life. Mass media communications have permitted their tastes
and folklore to permeate as deeply as the coves and valleys
where Elizabethan English is only warm-dead. Most literate
people recognize this as a truism; further, they know that the
giant corporations with millions or billions of dollars worth of
assets are stronger politically and economically than many of the
political states of the world. It is clear that they are monolithic
bureaucratic states; yet, this common knowledge is not used
with profit when a man thinks of problems on a close tangent
to this common knowing.
Thorstein Veblen once spoke of the intellectual revolution of.
the standard gauge.'05 Veblen believed that modem technology
which emphasizes precision measurement, careful analysis of
physical cause and effect, and the skeptical attitude toward
"established" truths would bring on a change in the thinking of
20th century man. Industrial man would see through the myths
that vested interests constructed to support them against the
challenges of emerging social groups. This robust skepticism, he
thought, would lead to a society founded upon realistic as
opposed to anthropomorphic thinking. Man would find truth in
facts; he would experiment and he would reject the unverified.
Veblen s belief is still only a hope. Although we have mastered
machines, formulae and forces, we still lapse into pnmitive ways
of thinking. Faiths and false hopes run our lives at the same time
that we tame nature with science. In some ways we are culturally
retarded. At times we are magicians of what George Orwell
105 Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise cl. IX (Mentor Ed. 1958).
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called double think, that is, the ability to hold m the mind
simultaneously two inconsistent propositions. And while holding
these two inconsistent propositions we are apparently free from
the anxiety that their inconsistency should generate. We do not
realize that they are at war. I argue that much of our thinking
about the managers of the corporate bureaucracies is of the
double think type. This failure of thought has made it easy for
certain corporate managers to maintain a preferred position in
terms of taxation. It also permits them to break the vertebrae
of proposed tax reforms. To give a concrete quality to this
thesis I first pose a particular tax problem: the restricted stock
option.
A corporation may give an employee the option to purchase
the corporation's stock at 95% of the market value of the stock
at the time of option. This option right may be granted so that
the option will survive for several years; the hope is that the
market value of the stock will increase. And from early m the
1950's that is what major stocks did. This option permits the
employee (who almost always turns out to be a manager) to sit
tight and watch the market move. If the market goes down, he
does not exercise the option; but if it goes up, he exercises the
option. After the stock has gone up in value the optionee may
exercise his option, but at this point he is not held to have any
taxable income. An illustration will make this clear. In 1957
"A" was granted an option on 500 shares at 95% of market value;
the current market value was $100 per share. The market value
of the stock goes up to $200 by 1960. At this point "A" exercises
his option; of course, he only pays $95 for each share of stock.
When he exercises the option he is by law held not to have
taxable income, although he makes a bargain buy, in fact,
making $105. At this point he is free to sell his shares on the
open market and receive the full market price. If he does he will
pay taxes at the ordinary scheduled rates. But if he holds the
stock for 6 months and then sells he pays a tax at the capital
gains rate. This short 6 month holding period has turned the
stock option into a sweet device for compensating executives by
saving them the pain of normal taxation. It is a perfect mechan-
ism as long as the Big Board is lusty and strong and the Big
Board has been that way for most of the 1950's and the 1960's.
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The executives of major corporations are well compensated
by way of salary In 1958 the median income for the highest
paid was almost $74,000.116 Some of the highest paid receive huge
salaries.0 7 For example: in 1956 Bethlehem Steel paid Eugene
Grace $809,000; in the same year General Motors paid Harlow
Curtice $573,000, and in 1954 DuPont paid Crawford Greenwalt
$501,293. Compare these with the President of the United States
who receives $100,000 and U S. Supreme Court Justices who
are paid $35,000. But it is not by salary that the top executives
become millionaires. U.S. News & World Report shows that the
stock option has much to do with the making of the millionaire.
In 1955 that magazine stated that, "In the past 5 years these
options have produced a whole new crop of millionaires." 10 8
Stock options have truly been bonanza for many top execu-
taves. In 1955 the Wall St. Journal reported that CBS president
Frank Stanton had made $4,500,000 by the stock option avenue.109
General Dynamics executives have made nice fortunes this way;
for instance, the late John Jay Hopkins." 0 In 1956 Mr. Hopkins
exercised old options which had been granted at $14.05 per
share; at the time he exercised his options the market price was
$40.71. His profit was about $1,190,000 and taxed at the
capital gains rate. These are but a few examples pulled from the
ranks of the many By 1957, 77% of all manufacturing corpora-
tions listed on the N.Y. Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange had option plans.'' Only 13 of the largest 100 indus-
trial corporations did not have option plans. Large blocks of
stock are being continually reserved for executives' option plans.
As of 1960 Inland Steel had assigned 11% of its outstanding
voting stock to option plans." 2 In 1960 the Ford Motor Co. set
aside 6.7% of its stock for option plans."3
.. This new method of compensation is naturally supported by
a developed rationale. As usual the rationale is nonsense in the
glow of current facts. The defenders of the stock option see it
106 1,700 Top Executives, Fortune, Nov. 1959, p. 138.
107 J. Lavingston, The Amencan Stockholder 222-23 (1958).
108 Quoted by Kolko, Wealth and Power In America 42 (1962).
109 J. Iavingston, op. cit supra note 107, at 228.
110 Ibd.
111 Kolko, op. cit. supra note 108, at 66.
112 Ibid.
i' Ibid.
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as a necessity grounded upon sound economic policy Risk free
options and a capital gains rate tax galvanize managers to labor
long and hard, to burn the midnight fluorescent bulbs, and to
keep the American economy free, dynamic, and progressive.
Salaries which are taxed at progressive rates are a poor way of
compensating executives. Stock options help to solve the com-
pensation problem, but they are not just compensation; they
give the executive an ownership share m his company He will
have a proprietary interest which will force him to be concerned
with the long term development of the company He will be no
dasher after short run profits at the expense of growth and
stability The growth and the stability of individual economic
entities are, of course, fundaments m the preserving of our
national economy [The crowbar in this demerol dream is the
six month holding period. A man who can sell his stock after 6
months and only pay taxes at the capital gains rate is not going
to look beyond current pleasure.] This concern with growth is
convenient camouflage, for the law as it stands mocks the argu-
ment that options link the managers to the business institutions.
This part of the mythology is as vapid as the usual rationales
of preference.
It is worth noting that this concern for economic growth has
meant nothing for companies that are not listed in the social
registers of business. By this I mean that unless a corporations
stock is listed on a major stock exchange, the men who are the
key personnel of the entity have no chance of profiting from
options. This is so as it is impossible to determine the value of
stock that is not widely held and often traded. The Treasury
will not attempt to place a value on such stock. Thus, only Big
Business personnel can profit from the stock option device.
To insure a solid understanding of our subject we next
examine certain of the facts about option practice. Bluntly put,
there is almost no control of option practice. Corporate insiders
rule in the land of the blind. Stockholder objection is a gelded
whisper. Diffusion of stock ownership, geographical separation
of stockholders and the control center of the corporation, stock-
holder ignorance, management control of proxy, and management
ownership and voting strength all engulf the challenges of the
impotent. Officers and directors work in unison or officers merely
1962]
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handle the whole affair, for the trend is to have boards of
directors composed largely of top managers. In some corpora-
tions the board is composed entirely of managers. No matter
who sits at the directors table, the board is usually friendly to
the managers. Managers have m most instances been able to
do as they please. The story of one major company depicts the
possibilities of power. Management proposed an option; it was
granted. Just a few years later they asked the stockholders for a
new option. When asked by stockholders what had happened to
the stock granted under the old option, the managers blithely
replied that they had sold it. The stockholders voted for a new
option plan.
Sometimes things are arranged so that stockholders are not
even asked to voice an opinion. Between 1956 and 1958 Alumi-
num Company of America stock dropped from $120 a share to
$70 a share. A "fairy godmother" committee, the company s six
highest paid officers and directors, cancelled options granted to
800 key employees. The option price had been $117.25 and
193,000 shares had been set aside for the optionees. This com-
mittee set up a new option program; the new option price on
these shares was $68.50. The stockholders of the company lost
$50 a share during this period, but the executives were perfectly
protected.
1
-
4
It is perfectly possible in this gingerbread world to have your
fortunes go up even when the market goes down. And when the
market turns to run the other way things are even brighter.
Sifting our information further we find that these things
characterize the usual option plan. It is discriminatory; it does
not benefit "employees" nearly as much as managers and direc-
tors; it is not aimed at management having a stake in the business
-rather, it is an accommodation for the avoidance of taxes; there
is no risk, and it is almost witln the complete control of the
heads of the particular corporate state.
Despite having received this information I believe that many
people would still retort that, "Well, they do deserve it anyway;
they are special." This means that The Managers are the epitome
of what the American Ideal is. They have made room at the top
114 This incident is related in Schlesinger, Selected Problems :n the Use of
Restricted Stock Options, 36 Taxes 709, 780 (1959).
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for themselves; they have won m the competitive dash. They
have displayed the strength of the strong. This is Horatio Alger
gone corporate. This unusual degree of unsophistication I feel
exists along with the knowledge that we are a bureaucratic
society where yes-manning and posing as articles of value mean
much more than personal worth and the dignity attached to it.
People understand this as a general thesis, but fail to apply to
specific cases that are related to a general philosophy that they
hold. This is what I mean when I say that we are the victims of
double-think.
Let us compare the great American executive in flesh and
flannel to this legend. The popular press has widely circulated
the success tales of poor boys who have risen to lead some
economic giant. It is these tales that provide ideological ]ustifica-
tion for executive privileges. If a man has hand-combated his
way up the knoll of success, he deserves special treatment-he is
king of the hill. It is definitely in America that cream rises to the
top.
The fact is that the top executives are not "country boys who
have made good in the city They are not immigrants. They
are urban, Protestant Americans born into families of the
upper and upper-middle classes. Their fathers were mainly
entrepreneurs, 577 are sons of businessmen; 47% of professional
men; 15% of farmers. Only 12% are sons of wage workers or
lower white-collar employees. For at least two generations
now, the families of the top executives of the big American
corporations have, as a group, been far removed from wage work
and the lower white-collar ranks."115
Every study of the executives of the large corporations support
Mills s conclusions." 6 Professor Mabel Newcomer, 117 filling out
Mills's view, tells that these top-executives have been provided
elite college educations and have been given the benefits of
important social contacts. Professor Newcomer tosses out the
interesting aside that lawyers are no longer an important element
among the top-executive group. Their training is too specialized
115 Mills, The Power Elite 127 (Oxford ed. 1959).116 See, e.g., F W Taussig & C. S. Joslyn, American Business Leaders
(1982); Mabel Newcomer, The Big Business Executive (1955); Roy Lewis &
Rosemary Stewart, The Managers (1961).
117 M. Newcomer, op. cit. supra note 116, at 65-82.
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and they have had little practice in personnel management;
further, they seem incapable of the broad view that is required
of executives.
Clearly Horatio has not climbed the greasy pole. Instead,
Oliver has succeeded, as might have been expected. It is clear
that our tax preferences do not provide a pot of golden oatmeal
for babies who achieve what every good boy has a chance to
win. The managerial elite is not made up of Tom Sawyers in
executive suites, or even Cash McCalls or Robert Youngs. The
American executive not only is not a poor boy who won; he is
something less than a plunging, fighting dervish of courage and
brain. In fact, he possesses few of the great American virtues-
virtues that I sincerely admire.
Here is the manager's picture. The image is conditioned by
the environment and 'the environment is bureaucratic. For the
corporation like the army and government meets the social
science definition of bureaucracy; also the reality test affirms
this social science view The essential elements of a bureaucratic
institution are a division of functions, an administrative hierarchy
and a professionalized managerial group. The managers of the
modem corporate giant are high-level bureaucrats. They move in
a world of formalized status and are acutely conscious of the
approved codes of behavior.
In this universe the conservation of investment and the main-
tenance of market position take precedence over technical inno-
vation. The size of the investment at stake makes these men
cautious and conservative; they are careful about their eggs and
baskets. This might certainly be one of the reasons our economy
has been growing at a sluggish rate. The word "entrepreneur"
with its connotation of caution to the clouds cannot be used to
describe them. Individual responsibility and personal decision-
making is not their mana; instead they prefer group action.
Conferences, committees, boards and agencies are their stable.
units of work. Collectivism might be an apt adjective for this
mode of doing business. Group action makes the group the
paramount organ and this tends to enforce an already strong
urge toward conformity Everyone must fit: dress, manner of
speech, leisure and attitudes all become stereotyped.""8 It is a
118 See W H. Whyte, Jr., The Orgamzation Man (1956).
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world where there can be no haggard hag of a wife in the family
cellar.
Robert A. Gordon in a Brookings Institute Study 19 has been
very blunt in his appraisal. He says the new captains are less
creative, restless and dynamic than the old tycoons. The analogy
might be that the old bold sluggers were the fathers of their
business, but the current crop of leaders are children of their
monster mothers. They do not give life to the corporation; they
are sustained by it. In his study of price-fixing in the electrical
industry,1 20 John Fuller, a newspaper writer, describes the GE
executives as group goslings. And sociologist Seymour Lipset ,2'
finds that in general persons intent on business success are not
creative persons. Their preoccupation is with money, status and
security Moreover, these top managers certainly can lay little
claim to intellectual interests. Many who recently played a most
active role in our national government could claim to be familiar
with little more than mysteries, western and texts on manage-
ment. And in 1954, Fortune admitted that:
The majority of top executives almost never read drama,
great fiction, the philosophers, the poets. Those who do
venture into this area are looked upon by their col-
leagues with mingled awe and mcredulity.u2
No one can doubt that executives work hard. Several reliable
studies have documented their heavy schedules. 23 Yet, they are
not what they and their publicists would have us believe them to
be.
The theory is that parts of our tax structure are designed to
subsidize those persons who demonstrate the virtues of individual-
ism and daring. This is a romantic philosophy, but I do not
believe it a bad one. However, we are in fact paying for the
maintenance of a myth when we subsidize a corporate elite.
There is nothing to indicate that they are superior to the thousands
of scientists, physicians, lawyers, professors, teachers, artists, in-
diwdual enterprisers, etc., who also contribute vital skills and
119 See W H. Whyte, Jr., Business Leadership in the Large Corporation
(1945).
120 John C. Fuller, The Gentlemen Conspirators (Black Cat ed. 1962).
121 Lipset, Political Man 326 (1960).
1= Why Don't Businessmen Read Books? Fortune, May 1954, p. 115.
1
2 3 For a good discussion on their work patterns see Hession, Miller &
Stoddart, The Dynanmcs of the American Economy 136-40 (1956).
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abilities to our way of living. There is not even any evidence to
show that men with the characteristics of our executives are
those best fit to control the fate of our economy They are just
men and in ability inferior to many other Americans.
IV END COMMENT" THE CODDLED AND THE COZENED
[T]here lay the tomahawk by the savage's szde, as if it were
a hatchet-faced baby. " Moby Dick.
The ideas that I have named nonsense, those fiscal fairy stones
told with singing tongue and furious jaw, are in nub nothing but
manufactured mirages. Still they do signify much, for their very
being and their mass adoption by the true believers, the public,
is as revealing as a Rorschach. Despite our nation s democratic
rumblings, the vulgar burping of privilege is audible. Loud
language fails to cover the civic bhmder. Sadly, society does as
nonsense is, but the crass sound of privilege is heard by the
"third ear."
This gross burping is an infallible omen of the presence of a
coddled elite in our society In addition (and, as usual) the
opposite of the coddled is in being-there are also the cozened.
They pay for the privilege of maintaining queen bees. Elites
will always exist, life being melded of genetic and social elements,
but, as I see it, there should be a functional basis for the sup-
porting of elites. Further, any elite group should receive rewards
of money, prestige, and privilege on a scale relative to the
function performed. Nothing should be granted them on the
gauze-like ground of metaphysical claim; eliters should not take
solely because they perform a peculiar, awe-evoking ritual.
Re-running the past pages of this article in the movie of the
mind, the varieties of tax preference are seen as rewards for
elite claims which are propped up by the bastion of illusion.
Behind the illusion, however, there is a support of substance.
There is power. Not naked fist power; not the fire power of
states of murder; instead, a perfumed power dolled up in the
velvet of finesse. This power is an amalgam of influence,
associations, and the other subtler forces of a mannered society
Taxation, of necessity, must be a matter of power. It is so doomed
as it concerns men, money and politics. Our task is to see that
power is distributed equitably so that there is social balance.
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But currently, taxation is but a game m which operating elites
ply the corridors of Congress using well-known, as well as secret,
techniques of persuasion. It is a game in which power ploys wear
the velvet veil of finesse and "kiss deadly" the public interest.
But this is not just an affair of Congress. In this game there are
rationalizers who dispense to the public patterns of signs and
symbols. These patterns appear as slogans and saymgs and
become part of the treasured folklore of the times. In these
messages to the people, freedom, democracy, initiative, in-
dividualism, the American Way of Life and other similar words
become key terms essential to mass manipulation. In this process
of "education" there is usually much that is hot and little that is
illuminating. Fulmination is the smoke grenade of obfuscation.
When these manipulated toddler tales are mixed with the
esotencism of the Internal Revenue Code, the manipulators have
exactly what is needed-a shimmering blackness, a space curve
of infinite ignorance. In the atmosphere of this air-raid of
absurdity man takes all on faith. Belief is easily adduced-it is
simply a case of Pavlovian conditonmg. He that has no better
can do no better. Repetition of the patterns of signs and symbols
rivets the mind and holds it to faith in perverted forms that
finally become bright bridges across imaginary canyons. In this
world of night, all is possible, much is probable.
My suggestion is that we depart from this departure from a
democratic theme. There is only one way in which we can
achieve a situation in accord with the creed we voice. Politics
must be used to kill the great "grotesques" that politics has
created. Certain politicians must bring the realities of taxation
to the people. What I suggest is a platform based on simple
equity and this would seem to be an approach of pith. Mainly,
reform depends upon a campaign in which accurate facts and
figures are dispensed. The American people are not stupid but
they are intellectually underfed. A public fattened on facts might
soon be ready to vote into Congress some men free of the lariats
of the loopholers.
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